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Abstract 
This paper presents a tour of welfare reform in the UK since the last change of 
government, summarising the most important changes in active labour market 
policies, and in measures intended to strengthen financial incentives to work. It 
argues that developments in the UK’s active labour market policies occurred in 
two broad phases: first, the Government sought to strengthen ALMPs for those 
individuals deemed to be unemployed, through the New Deal programme. 
Second, the Government has reformed benefits for individuals traditionally 
viewed as inactive and thus excused job search activity, such as lone parents, 
and the sick and disabled. Accompanying these have been changes to direct 
taxes, tax credits and welfare benefits aiming to strengthen financial work 
incentives. However, financial work incentives have been strengthened by less 
than might be expected given the early rhetoric: the expansion in family-based 
tax credits have weakened the financial work incentives of (potential) second 
earners in families with children, many more workers now face combined 
marginal tax and tax credit withdrawal rates in excess of 60% than a decade 
ago, and a desire to achieve broad reductions in relative child poverty has led 
the Government to increase substantially income available to non-working 
families with children. We also summarise evaluations of three important UK 
welfare-to-work reforms (WFTC, NDYP and Pathways to Work), but without 
comparing their efficacy.  
                                                      
* Mike Brewer, Programme Director, Direct Tax and Welfare sector, Institute for Fiscal 
Studies, contact mike_b@ifs.org.uk. This paper was written at the request of the Economic 
Council of Sweden. Support from the ESRC Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of 
Public Policy at the Institute for Fiscal Studies is gratefully acknowledged. The author is very 
grateful to Richard Blundell for comments and discussions on these issues, and to colleagues 
at the IFS whose joint work is referred to in this paper. The Labour Force Survey (LFS) and 
the Family Resources Survey (FRS) are Crown Copyright material, and are reproduced with 
the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen’s Printer for Scotland. The LFS is 
available from the UK Data Archive, and the FRS was made available by the Department for 
Work and Pensions, neither of which bears any responsibility for analysis or interpretation in 
this paper.  
 11. Introduction 
This paper gives a necessarily partial and brief overview of reforms to welfare 
to work policies (sometimes shortened to “welfare reforms”) in the UK since 
1997, the year that the New Labour party formed the government. The aim has 
been to describe some of the key policies, discuss the impact of policies on a 
(small) number of employment-related indicators, but also summarise some of 
the more thorough econometric evaluations of particular welfare reforms 
(although with no attempt to compare the policies discussed).  
Chapter 2 gives some details of the main measures: reforms to what can be 
thought of as active labour market policies, and then reforms to taxes and 
benefits aimed at strengthening financial work incentives. Chapter 3 shows 
what happened to financial work incentives and some employment and poverty 
outcomes that could be thought of as success measures for welfare reforms. 
Chapter 4 summarises the results of econometric evaluations of Working 
Families’ Tax Credit, the New Deal for Young People, and the new Pathways 
to Work pilot (for recipients of incapacity benefit), arguably the three most 
important changes since 1997. Section 5 concludes.    
2. Main welfare to work reforms – description 
In this section, we give an overview of the various aspects of welfare to work 
policies, or other policies expected to have a significant impact on groups on 
welfare.
1
2.1  Active Labour Market Policies 
The centrepiece of the Labour Government’s welfare to work reforms in its 
first few years was the New Deal. In the general policy parlance, the New Deal 
represents a strengthening of the ALMP applicable to recipients of out-of-work 
benefits. There are a number of New Deals aimed at different groups on 
welfare, each with differing eligibility requirements and varying degrees of 
compulsion. For example, the New Deal for Young People is compulsory for 
all those under 25 who have been unemployed for 6 months; the New Deals for 
Lone Parents (NDLP), by contrast, are voluntary programmes that offer only 
advice and support, with no threat of financial sanctions.  NDYP, therefore, 
places significant restrictions on the behaviour of young long- term 
unemployed as well as offering extra support; NDLP, though, represents only 
additional support. As we discuss later, this reflects that lone parents are 
excused from having to claim a benefit for the unemployed until their children 
are all aged 16 or more. 
                                                      
1 An early exposition of the current Government’s priorities for welfare reform can be found 
in HM Treasury (1997); a more recent one is DWP (2006). Reassuringly, the two have much 
in common. 
 2New Deal for Young People (18 to 24) 
The New Deal for Young People (NDYP) was introduced across the UK in 
April 1998; before this time, there was no specific programme for young 
unemployed people, only for the long-term unemployed. Participation in 
NDYP is compulsory for all young people aged between 18 and 24 who have 
been claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) for at least six months, and 
involves up to four months of extensive assistance with job search from a 
personal advisor. If participants have not found employment by the end of this 
‘gateway’ period, then they are offered up to four options, all of which seek to 
improve their employability (these are: subsidised job placement with training. 
education, voluntary or environmental work). By the end of 2004, there have 
been almost 1.2 million completed spells on NDYP. 38 per cent of participants 
left for sustained
2 unsubsidised jobs, 11 per cent transferred to other benefits, 
20 per cent have left for other known reasons, while the remaining 31 per cent 
for unknown reasons. 
New Deal for 25 plus 
The national New Deal 25 Plus programme (ND25+) was originally launched 
in June 1998 and reformed in April 2001. The programme focuses upon the 
long-term unemployed with mandatory participation for all individuals who 
have been claiming JSA for 18 of the last 21 months. The programme now 
shares common features with the NDYP, beginning with an initial ‘gateway’ 
period lasting for up to four months, followed by an ‘Intensive Activity Period’ 
(IAP) typically lasting for no more than 26 weeks. The IAP includes flexible 
packages of support which can combine work experience/placements, work 
focused training and help with motivation and soft skills.  
New Deal for Lone Parents, New Deal for Disabled People, New Deal for 50 
plus and New Deal for Partners 
These are all voluntary programmes open to different groups of the inactive or 
unemployed (New Deal for Partners is aimed at non-working partners of 
benefit recipients). Participants in the programme are assigned a personal 
advisor, who generally assists with a range of job search activities. 
Jobcentre Plus 
 A key operational change introduced by the government was the merger of the 
two agencies individually responsible for employment services and 
administration of social security benefits into one body known as Jobcentre 
Plus (administration of social security benefits for those aged 60 and over has 
been given to another agency). As well as reducing government’s 
administrative costs and claimants’ compliance costs, the aim was to allow the 
Government to place greater emphasis on getting benefit claimants back to 
work, even for those receiving a benefit for the inactive (who therefore face no 
                                                      
2
 A sustained job is defined as one lasting for more than 13 weeks. 
 3requirement to look for work), such as lone parents and those with ill-health or 
disabilities.   
Pathways to Work 
In line with the trend for later reforms to focus on those recipients of benefits 
supposedly designed for the inactive, since October 2003 the Government has 
been piloting reforms which both provide greater support (financial and non-
financial) and impose greater obligations to encourage claimants of incapacity 
benefits to move into paid work. These are known as the ‘Pathways to Work’ 
reforms. The Government has already committed to extending the reforms 
across the UK by 2008, and set a long-term target to reduce the number of 
individuals claiming incapacity benefits by 1 million within ten years (DWP, 
2006).  
Like other OECD countries, the numbers of individuals claiming incapacity 
benefits have risen considerably in recent years, more than trebling in GB over 
the last quarter of a century. Moreover, as shown in Figure 2.1, despite the 
replacement in April 1995 of Invalidity Benefit with Incapacity Benefit – 
which was designed to have a more stringent health test – the number of 
claimants of these benefits aged under the State Pension Age has continued to 
grow over the last ten years, albeit at a slower rate than over the previous ten 
years, chiefly because of a sharp rise in female claimants. 
Figure 2.1 Number of claimants of Invalidity and Incapacity Benefit aged under 
















































































Source: DWP (taken from Adam et al (2006)) . 
 
 4Many individuals receiving Incapacity Benefit do so for a long time. As stated 
in the recent DWP five year strategy, on average those claiming the benefit for 
more than twelve months end up claiming for eight years (DWP, 2005). The 
reforms being piloted are motivated by concerns that the current arrangements 
do not do enough (indeed, do nothing at all) to encourage claimants back into 
paid work or help them manage their health condition (a detailed discussion 
can be found in the Green Paper which proposed the pilots: DWP, 2002). 
The Pathways to Work package of reforms for new claimants of incapacity 
benefits includes three aspects: mandatory monthly work-focused interviews 
during the first six months (those with particularly serious medical conditions 
are exempted) a set of health-related and labour market programmes, and 
increased financial support and incentives, with a  new Return to Work Credit 
paying £40 a week for the first year of paid employment after leaving 
incapacity benefits if gross annual earnings are below £15,000.  
Lone Parents 
The treatment of lone parents within the welfare system deserves particular 
attention for a number of reasons. First, the UK has internationally high 
proportions of families with children headed by a lone parent (currently 25%, 
with longitudinal data suggesting that one third of mothers will spend some 
time as a lone mother before all her children are aged 18). Second, lone parents 
tend to have relatively poor skills, and those in work tend to work part-time for 
relatively low wages, and so whether working or not, they make up a 
significant proportion of the group likely to be affected by welfare reforms. 
Third, the UK has very generous (by international standards) rules for lone 
parents who claim welfare benefits: lone parents in the UK are excused from 
all job-search requirements until their youngest child reaches 16. Partly as a 
consequence of the latter two points, fewer than half of lone parents were in 
work in 1997, and relative poverty rates for children in lone parent families 
were much higher than children in couple families.
3   
Many of the changes to tax credits, minimum wage, and childcare policies 
(described in section 2.2) have been of particular help to lone parents. But it is 
only very recently that the Government has proposed increasing the 
requirements asked of lone parents on welfare, with a proposal that lone 
parents should have to engage in job-search as a condition of receiving benefit 
when their youngest child reaches 12. Previous reforms had the stated aim of 
making the NDLP more effective and more accessible, requiring lone parents 
to meet at least annually with a personal adviser (case worker), and had 
introduced a time-limited in-work bonus.
4  
                                                      
3 See Brewer et al (2007b). 
4 This is much like the Return to Work bonus: it pays £40 a week, for up to 12 months 
duration, to lone parents who have been on welfare for at least a year and then leave welfare 
 52.2  Changes to financial incentives to work 
This section describes the main ways in which the current UK Government has 
sought to strengthen financial work incentives for those with low earning 
power, discussing the minimum wage, personal tax changes and then changes 
to in-work benefits and tax credits. 
Minimum wage 
In April 1999, a national minimum wage (NMW) was introduced in the UK at 
a rate of £3.00 per hour for those aged 18-21 (the development rate) and at the 
higher rate of £3.60 per hour for those aged 22 and over (Table 2.1). In Spring 
1998, before the NMW was introduced, the Office for National Statistics 
estimated that 1.3 million individuals were paid wages below these 
introductory rates.
5 By the following year, the number of individuals who were 
estimated to be paid below these rates had fallen to a little under half a million, 
and since then the number of individuals paid below the operating national 
minimum wage rates has been relatively stable, fluctuating slightly between 
about 230,000 and 340,000.
6 The value of the minimum wage relative to the 
economy-wide average hourly wage rate has been increasing: in 1999, the main 
rate was equivalent to 36.8% (47.0%) of the mean (median) wage in that year, 
but by 2004 it was worth 39.8% (51.9%) of the respective mean (median) 
wage.  
Table 2.1. The UK’s minimum wage  
Rates effective 




April 1999  £3.60  £3.00  £7.66  £9.79 
October 2000  £3.70  £3.20  £7.93  £10.22 
October 2001  £4.10  £3.50  £8.28  £10.78 
October 2002  £4.20  £3.60  £8.62  £11.35 
October 2003  £4.50  £3.80  £8.95  £11.73 
October 2004  £4.85  £4.10  £9.35  £12.18 
October 2005  £5.05  £4.25  £9.56  £12.50 
October 2006  £5.35  £4.45  £9.95  £13.00 
October 2007  £5.52  £4.60     
Notes: Main rate paid to workers aged 22 years and older. Development rate paid to workers aged 18 - 21 years 
inclusive and workers aged 22 years and above who starting a new job with a new employer and doing accredited 
training. From October 2004 a new rate of £3.00 per hour was introduced. This applies to all 16 year olds who are no 
longer of compulsory school age, and 17 year olds. Mean and median wages are for all adult employees. 
Source: Low Pay Commission website (http://www.lowpay.gov.uk/). Mean and Median wages: derived from ASHE 
and taken from http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase/Product.asp?vlnk=13101.  
                                                                                                                                                        
to get a job. Early evaluation results, though, show very small impacts on labour market 
outcomes: Brewer et al (2007a). 
5 Office for National Statistics (2004a). 
6  Individuals can be paid less than the minimum wage either through genuine non-
compliance, or through errors in the household surveys on which these estimates are based. 
 6 
In general, a binding minimum wage should increase the gap between in-work 
and out-of-work incomes for low-skilled groups, and so induce an increase in 
labour supply. It may also, however, reduce the demand for labour if low 
skilled workers become uneconomic to employ. Dickens and Manning (2002) 
find that virtually all of the impact of the NMW on the distribution of wages 
occurred within the first two months of its introduction, and the impact on 
employment seems to have been small (see, for example, Machin and Wilson 
(2004) or Stewart (2004)). The impact on welfare to work policies may, then, 
be limited, but the Government now sees the minimum wage as an essential 
backstop to low wages, particularly to help prevent the incidence of in-work 
support (see section 3.2) being entirely on employers.  
Personal tax changes 
In the current Government’s first parliamentary term, a series of changes were 
made to income tax and social insurance contributions (called National 
Insurance in the UK) which particularly affected low-paid workers, and which 
were (correctly) described by the Government as improving financial gains to 
working for the low-wage. Compared with the changes to financial work 
incentives arising from the Working Families’ Tax Credit, the impact of these 
changes was much smaller on any individual’s financial incentives, but 
affecting many more workers. To save space, they are not described further 
here.
 7
In-work benefit reform  
Since 1997, there have been two sets of changes to in-work benefits (or tax 
credits). The first of these (in October 1999; the replacement of a programme 
called family credit (FC) with one called Working Families’ Tax Credit) was 
motivated by concerns to improve the incentives for (some) low-earning 
parents to be in work. The rationale for the second set of reforms (in April 
2003, which introduced the child and working tax credits) is less clear, though, 
and most domestic attention since 2003 has been devoted to operational issues 
of implementing a tax credit assessed on combined family income given the 
constraints of an income tax system that is individually assessed. 
Phase 1: the Working Families Tax Credit 
In October 1999, a programme called family credit was replaced by Working 
Families’ Tax Credit (WFTC). In the jargon, WFTC was a ‘refundable’ tax 
credit, ie payable even if it exceeded the family’s income tax liability. To be 
                                                      
7 See HM Treasury (1998) for the report recommending some of these change, and Myck 
(2000) and Gregg et al (1999) for analysis. One of these changes, however – a lower rate of 
income tax (10%) on the first £2,000 of income – has since been removed in favour of a lower 
basic rate of tax (which was 23% in 1997, and is due to be 20% by 2008): this was announced 
in the 2007 Budget (HMT (2007)). 
 7entitled, at least one adult in a family with children must work at least 16 hours 
a week. So-called “hours rules” are a pervasive feature in the UK welfare 
benefit system, and have since spread into in-work tax credits.
8  
There is a basic credit for each family plus additions for each child, and this is 
withdrawn once earnings exceed a disregard. The phase-out or withdrawal rate 
in WFTC was 55%, but this applies to earnings after income tax and social 
insurance have been deducted, so the usual overall marginal deduction rate for 
someone receiving WFTC was 69%. 
9
In operational terms, there was little difference between WFTC and its 
predecessor, family credit (FC): for example, WFTC was still subject to strict 
capital rules, like all welfare benefits in the UK. The one high-profile 
operational difference, though, was that WFTC was administered by the tax 
authority (not the agency responsible for social security benefits), and, except 
where couples with children requested it to be paid to a non-working adult, was 
paid to individuals through employers.  
However, the more important difference with FC was that WFTC was 
substantially more generous, with a higher earnings disregard, a lower 
withdrawal rate, more generous entitlements, and a subsidy for childcare 
expenditures.
10 Overall, these changes substantially increased in-work incomes 
for eligible families, and the number of eligible families, and the WFTC was 
approximately twice as expensive as its immediate predecessor: Figure 2.2 
shows that expenditure on employment tax credits almost doubled between 
1998–99 and 2000–01, going from £2.68 billion to £4.81 billion in constant 
2002 prices. There was a further substantial increase by 2002, to £6.46 billion.  
Figure 2.2. Expenditure on in-work programmes in Great Britain, 1991/2 – 2002/3 
                                                      
8 Theoretically, they allow for a closer targeting on low wages, rather than low earners, but 
this must be traded off against the increased complexity of design and administration and the 
need for monitoring/compliance checks.  
9 In 2000/1, for example, income tax was 22% and employee payroll tax was 10%. Of the 
68% of any increase in earnings retained by the employee after these taxes, 55% was lost in 
foregone WFTC, so the combined withdrawal rate was 0.32 + 0.55 * (1 – 0.32)  = 69%. 
Families also in receipt of means-tested benefits that help with rents or local taxes (known, 
respectively, as housing benefit and council tax benefit, would, though, face higher rates than 
these). 
10 The UK has a mixed-economy provision of childcare; many low-income families with 
children would be paying for work-related childcare from self-employed (but regulated) 

































































DPTC – disabled person’s tax credit. DWA – disability working allowance. 
Note: WFTC replaced FC in October 1999, so there was expenditure on both of them during 
the 1999–2000 tax year.  
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
While reducing the marginal withdrawal rate of those who would have been 
eligible for Family Credit, this change also increased the numbers of workers 
who faced a tax credit withdrawal as their earnings rose on top of income tax 
and social insurance, and so the number of workers facing marginal withdrawal 
rates in excess of 60% (the top income tax rate in the UK is 40%) has risen 
accordingly (from 0.8m to 1.7m: this is discussed further in Section 5.1. As we 
shall see later, the fact that WFTC is assessed on the joint income of a couple 
means that, as more families with children became entitled to it, so did 
incentives to work for many potential second (and mostly female) workers 
weaken. 
Phase 2: the child and working tax credits 
Tax credits were further reformed in 2003 with the introduction of child tax 
credit (CTC) and working tax credit (WTC), in what was the biggest change in 
support for children since the introduction of child benefit in 1977. The CTC 
merged together several parts of the tax and benefit system that supported 
families with children, while WTC extended in-work support to adults without 
children (for the first time). CTC and WTC, like WFTC, are refundable tax 
credits. 
This reform was not primarily motivated by strengthening work incentives: in 
fact, there were minimal changes to budget constraints in April 2003. Instead, 
the reforms entirely overhauled the administration of tax credits, bringing them 
closer to the income tax system in terms of concepts and definitions (so tax 
credits now depend upon annual income as defined for income tax purposes) 
 9but keeping their administration and payment mechanisms separate from 
income tax.
11   
The current set of tax credits probably illustrate the Government’s frustration 
with both the income tax and the welfare system as ways of targeting financial 
support: the income tax system does not allow sufficiently accurate targeting, 
and traditional means-tested benefits are seen as unacceptably complicated and 
stigmatising, and inappropriate for a programme that covers the vast majority 
of families with children. But tax credits have experienced considerable and 
widely-reported administrative difficulties ever since computer problems 
caused substantial delays to payments to many families in the first few months 
of 2003–04. Because of this, much policy attention since 2003 has been on 
improving their operation, rather than the inherent work incentives. In fact, as 
we argue later, the current pattern of changes to entitlements to tax credits is 
weakening, rather than strengthening, work incentives.  
A more significant change economically in 2003 was that, for the first time in 
the UK, additional support was offered to families without children who were 
in work but on a low income, through the WTC. This is less generous than it is 
for families with children: those without children have to be aged 25 or over, to 
work full-time, and to be on very low wages. Around 320,000 families without 
children receive the working tax credit, but take-up (programme participation) 
is extremely low, at under 1 in 5.
12  Given this take-up rate is so much lower 
than amongst families with children, the most plausible explanation is that tax 
credits for working adults without children are still novel, and information and 
awareness about them still low. 
Welfare benefit changes 
This Government’s changes to taxes and benefits affecting families with 
children have by no means all been to encourage work: a concern to reduce 
child poverty in broad terms has led the Government to increase substantially 
the additional amounts payable for children in welfare benefits (before 2003) 
and amounts payable in the non-work-contingent child tax credit (after 2003). 
Both these directly weaken incentives to work, as we discuss below.  
Work-related Childcare  
Work-related childcare in the UK is provided by public and private suppliers, 
but the extent of Government intervention into this mixed market has increased 
dramatically since 1997, with the aims of expanding labour supply choices, 
improving work–life balance for parents but also advancing the long-term 
social and educational outcomes of children.  
                                                      
11 See Brewer (2003) for amplification of these points. 
12 HMRC (2007). 
 10The main policy for achieving the first of these has been to make substantially 
more generous parental subsidies for spending on formal childcare (ie 
nurseries, after-school clubs, childminders, but not for informal payments to 
friends and families) that are directly paid to parents in work, with the current 
incarnation of this programme known as the childcare tax credit.
 13 In real 
terms, spending on the childcare tax credit in December 2004 was more than 16 
times greater than spending on its equivalent in November 1998. Although this 
large increase in subsidy presumably encourages parents to use formal 
childcare rather than informal childcare, the impact on maternal labour supply 
is less clear. There has been no direct evaluation, and a review of US studies 
suggests that the elasticity of  maternal labour supply to the price of childcare is 
very low
14
There have also been changes to the provision of early education, and 
considerable supply-side interventions to increase the amount of childcare 
places provided by the non-government sector: these are discussed more in 
Brewer et al (2005).  
2.3 Conclusions 
The intention of this section is to give an overview of the key welfare to work 
changes since 1997. In the area of ALMPs, the UK Government first expanded 
the role of ALMPs for those people on benefits traditionally considered to be 
unemployed through the New Deal; more recent reforms – which are still 
incomplete – are aiming to get back to work welfare recipients traditionally 
considered to be inactive, and therefore excused from job search requirements 
(the sick and disabled, and lone parents). These changes have been 
complemented with general direct tax reforms to strengthen incentives to work 
for all low earners, and targeted in-work tax credit programmes, mostly for 
families with children.  
 
3. Outcomes 
This section is designed to review some high-level outcomes, which might be 
thought of as “success measures”.  
Although not strictly an outcome, we first review how tax and benefit changes 
have altered financial work incentives, particularly for families with children, 
given that so much of the UK Government’s changes have been to tax credits 
for  families with children. We then review broad changes in employment-
related outcomes, and then examine trends in relative poverty. 
                                                      
13 See Brewer et al (2005) for further details of the topics presented below. 
14  See Brewer and Paull (2004) and studies cited there. 
 113.1 Financial work incentives  
Given that considerable attention has been focused with the UK Government 
on strengthening financial work incentives, it is appropriate to consider both 
how they vary across different family types, but also how they have changed in 
recent years.  
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 focus more directly on  the impact of tax and benefit 
changes since 1997/8 on financial work incentives: Table 3.1 shows the 
replacement rates of working parents, summarising some of the features of the 
changing distributions, and Table 3.2 shows how the distribution of marginal 
effective tax rates has changed.
15 Both sets of statistics have been calculated by 
holding constant the characteristics of the population, and considering the real 
impact of tax and benefit changes on these work incentive measures. 
Table 3.1 The impact of tax and benefit changes from 1997 – 2004 on the replacement 
rates of working parents  







Lone parents     
Mean 67.9 65.0 -2.9 
Median 71.9 65.9 -6.0 
25
th centile 55.8  52.3  -3.5 
75
th centile 81.9  80.4  -1.5 
Proportion whose rate rises 21.3% 
Proportion whose rate falls 56.7% 
Individuals in couples with children whose partner 
does not work     
Mean 59.3 61.1 +1.8 
Median 62.6 65.5 +2.9 
25
th centile 41.3  45.3  +4.0 
75
th centile 80.6  79.5  -1.1 
Proportion whose rate rises 52.7% 
Proportion whose rate falls 26.6% 
Individuals in couples with children whose partner 
does  work     
Mean 59.2 62.5 +3.3 
Median 58.5 62.7 +4.2 
25
th centile 45.6  50.4  +4.8 
75
th centile 74.3  76.0  +1.7 
Proportion whose rate rises 53.8% 
Proportion whose rate falls 6.6% 
                                                      
15 The replacement rate is defined as net income if out of work divided by net income in 
work. The marginal effective tax rate measures what fraction of a small rise in earnings is lost 
in income tax, employees’ social insurance contributions and foregone benefit and tax credit 
payments (it ignores employers’ social insurance contributions). 
 12     
Source: authors’ calculations from FRS 2002/03 and TAXBEN and taken from Brewer and Shephard (2004). 
Notes: Excludes parents aged over 55 and self-employed. The row marked “25
th centile” reports the replacement rate 
which is higher than 25% of all replacement rates faced by that family type. The row marked “75
th centile” reports the 
replacement rate which is higher than 75% of all replacement rates faced by that family type. 
 
Table 3.2 The impact of tax and benefit changes from 1997 – 2004 effective marginal 
rate faced by working parents 







Lone parents     
Mean 58.0   58.3  +0.3 
Median 72.5 69.0 -3.5 
Proportion whose rate rises 31.2% 
Proportion whose rate falls 46.9% 
Individuals in couples with children whose partner 
does not work       
Mean 43.0 48.2 +5.2 
Median 35.7 42.1 +4.4 
Proportion whose rate rises 45.4% 
Proportion whose rate falls 21.0% 
Individuals in couples with children whose partner 
does  work     
Mean 32.5     36.8  +6.1 
Median 33.0 34.9 +1.9 
Proportion whose rate rises 39.4% 
Proportion whose rate falls 10.0% 
     
Source: authors’ calculations from FRS 2002/03 and TAXBEN and taken from Brewer and Shephard (2004) 
Notes: Excludes parents aged over 55 and self-employed. The row marked “25
th centile” reports the marginal tax rate 
which is higher than 25% of all marginal tax rate faced by that family type. The row marked “75
th centile” reports the 
marginal tax rate which is higher than 75% of all marginal tax rates faced by that family type. 
 
The changes to the tax and benefit system between April 1997 and April 2004 
imply that: 
•  The majority of lone parents now face a stronger reward to work than in 
1997. 
•  The UK Government’s tax and benefit reforms have hardly changed the 
mean effective marginal tax rate faced by working lone parents, while 
the median effective marginal tax rate has fallen. More lone parents 
have experienced a strengthening of their incentive to progress than 
have experienced a worsening. 
•  Low-earning lone parents face stronger financial incentives to progress 
in the labour market, whilst medium- and high-earning lone parents face 
 13smaller financial incentives to progress (not shown in tables – see 
Brewer and Shephard, 2004). 
•  A small number of couples with children face an increased financial 
reward for having one adult in work, but many more face a smaller 
financial reward. The same set of reforms since 1997 has weakened the 
financial reward to having a second earner. Together with the first 
effect, this means that a couple with children now faces a relatively 
stronger incentive, on average, to be a single earner couple, rather than 
to have two earners or none, than in 1997.  
•  The financial incentives to progress for the majority of workers in 
couples with children have worsened, with the mean effective marginal 
tax rate faced by individuals in couples with children 5 percentage 
points higher, thanks to the Government’s tax and benefit reforms. The 
increases in the median effective marginal tax rate have not been as 
large, however. 
3.2  Indicators of employment and worklessness  
Since 1997 the employment rate of women has increased from 67.2% to 70.2% 
(in 2006) with the majority of this increase concentrated between 1997 and 
2001 (see Figure 3.1). Over the same period, the employment rate of men rose 
from 77.7% to 78.8%. Taken together, these increases imply an increase in the 
overall employment rate from 72.9% to 74.6%. This rise in the employment 
rates did not begin with the current Labour government, however: the 
employment rate has been rising since the recession of the early 1990s. The 
employment rate of men is still lower than it was in the 1970s, but that of 
women is substantially higher, and it is this increase that has helped raise the 
employment rate to its highest level since the 1970s. However, it is notable that 
the rise in employment has not been experienced amongst the low skilled 
(defined in this case as the 15% of the working-age population with the least 
qualifications, usually none), for whom employment has fallen almost 
continuously since 1992: other groups usually thought of as being 
disadvantaged in the labour market (older working age individuals , lone 
parents, those with disabilities, ethnic minorities), by contrast, have seen their 
employment rates converge with the economy-wide average since 1997.
16   
                                                      
16 This discussion is based on the DWP’s Opportunity for All indicator 19, 
http://www.dwp.gov.uk/ofa/indicators/indicator-19.asp . 





















































































(right axis) Thatcher Major Blair
Notes: Seasonally adjusted. The employment rate is calculated as the proportion of the population of working age 
(16-59 for women and 16-64 for men) who are in employment (working at least one hour in the reference week or 
temporarily away from a job). Low skilled defined as the 15% of the working-age population with the lowest 
qualifications (most of whom have no qualifications). 
Source: Department for Work and Pensions (Opportunity for All Indicator 18) based on original data from Office for 
National Statistics. 
There has been a clear shift in the focus of the Government’s welfare to work 
policies since 1997 from the unemployed to the inactive. This broadly reflects 
the Government’s perceived success in reforming active labour market policies 
for the unemployed. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 therefore show unemployment and 
inactivity rates.  
Unemployment (ILO) is very low by historical standards, and the Government 
claims that its range of New Deals has been instrumental in achieving this. 
Inactivity rates, though, are broadly unchanged since 1997, with falling 
inactivity amongst women (mainly mothers) being offset by rising inactivity 
amongst men (mainly those in poor health). For men, the most common reason 
for inactivity is long-term sickness, followed by being in education, and those 
who retired before reaching the state pension age.
 17 Since 1997, the slight rise 
in the inactivity rate amongst men is explained by increases in the number of 
students, those retiring early, and other factors. For women, the single most 
important reason for inactivity is if they are looking after family or their home 
(in 1997 this was cited as the reason by half of all inactive women). While the 
number of women who are economically inactive either through long-term 
sickness or because they are studying has increased since 1997, this has been 
more than offset by a decline in the number of women who care for family 
and/or their home. For both men and women, the proportion of the 
economically inactive who say they would like a job has declined since 1997 
from 31.4% to 25.5%. 
                                                      
17 See Office for National Statistics (2005). 









































































Notes: Seasonally adjusted. Unemployment is measured according to the ILO definition. This covers people who are: 
out of work, want a job, have actively sought work in the previous four weeks and are available to start work within 
the next fortnight; or out of work and have accepted a job that they are waiting to start in the next fortnight. 
Source: Office for National Statistics. 






















































































Notes: Seasonally adjusted. The inactivity rate is calculated as the proportion of the working age population who are 
neither employed or unemployed (see figure notes for Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2). 
Source: Office for National Statistics. 
Some of the Government’s most high profile employment policies – the 
Working Families’ Tax Credit and the New Tax Credits – have been targeted 
either exclusively or largely at families with children, and Figure 3.4 shows 
that employment rates have risen in four groups of adults in families with 
dependent children. Men in couples with children and women living in couples 
with a working partner have relative high rates, and both are higher now than in 
1997, although there is a suggestion that the employment rate of mothers with 
working partners may have plateaued. However, more disadvantaged groups 
 16(lone parents, and women in couples  with a non-working partner) have seen 
much greater growth in employment. In particular, the employment rate of lone 
parents rose from 45.5% to 56.5% between 1997 and 2006 [2006 not shown in 
the graph]. This has meant that the proportion of children in workless 
households – a key target of the labour Government when it came to power – 
has fallen from 18.5% to 16.1% since 1997 (not shown). 












1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Lone parents
Women in couples: father
works
Women in couples: father
does not work
Fathers in couples
Source: from Brewer and Shephard (2004), based on quarterly Labour Force Survey data.  
 
3.3 Relative  poverty 
As discussed above, the UK Government has sought to reduce relative poverty, 
with  tough targets for reductions amongst children (see Waldfogel, this 
volume). 
Table 3.3 shows relative poverty rates (ie, the proportion of the population 
living in households with less than 60% of median equivalised income) since 
1996/7. Other than a blip upwards in the last year, the trend over the past 
decade has been for falls in relative poverty, concentrated amongst children 
(and their parents) and pensioners. However, relative poverty rates amongst the 
remaining group – working-age non-parents, is in 2005/6 at its highest ever 
level.  
Table 3.3. Relative poverty: percentage and number of individuals in households with 
incomes below 60% of median AHC income 





  % Million % Million % Million % Million % Million
1996–97 (GB)  34.1  4.3  29.1  2.9  26.6 3.3 17.2 3.5 25.3  14.0 
1997–98 (GB)  33.2  4.2  29.1  2.9  25.9 3.2 15.9 3.3 24.4  13.6 
1998–99 (GB)  33.9  4.3  28.6  2.9  26.3 3.2 15.5 3.2 24.4  13.6 
1999–00 (GB)  32.7  4.2  27.6  2.8  25.5 3.1 16.1 3.4 24.0  13.4 
2000–01 (GB)  31.1  3.9  25.9  2.6  24.7 3.0 16.2 3.4 23.1  13.0 
2001–02 (GB)  30.8  3.9  25.6  2.6  24.5 3.0 15.6 3.4 22.7  12.8 
2002–03 (UK)  29.8  3.9  24.2  2.5  24.1 3.0 16.5 3.7 22.4  13.1 
2003–04 (UK)  28.7  3.7  20.6  2.2  23.5 2.9 16.6 3.7 21.5  12.6 
2004–05 (UK)  28.4  3.6  17.6  1.9  23.0 2.9 16.1 3.6 20.5  12.1 
2005–06 (UK)  29.8  3.8  17.0  1.8  24.8 3.1 17.5 4.0 21.6  12.7 
            
Changes (ppt)            
Total: 1996–97 
to 2005–06 
–4.3   –12.1  –1.8  (0.3)  –3.6  
Labour I: 1996–97 
to 2000–01 
–3.0  –3.2  –1.9  –1.0  –2.1  
Labour II: 2000–01 
to 2004–05 
–2.8  –8.3  –1.6   (–0.1)  –2.6  
Latest year: 2004–
05 to 2005–06 
(1.4) (0.2)  (–0.6) (–0.1) 1.8 0.2 1.4 0.3 1.1 0.7 
Notes: Reported changes may not equal the differences between the corresponding numbers 
due to rounding. Changes in parentheses are not significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level. Changes in the number of individuals in poverty are only shown where these can be 
calculated consistently at the UK level. All figures are presented using the modified OECD 
equivalence scale.  
Source: from Brewer et al (2007b), based on Family Resources Survey, various years. 
 
Although the UK government has not seemed so concerned with overall 
inequality, it is instructive to review progress in this area.
18 The Gini 
coefficient in Great Britain rose from a value of around 0.25 in 1979 and 
reached a peak in the early 1990s of around 0.34. Since the early 1990s, the 
changes in income inequality have been less dramatic: after falling slightly 
over the early to mid-1990s, inequality is effectively unchanged from its level 
in the mid 1990s, and remains at historically high levels (not shown here).
19
                                                      
18 One view is that the concern for relative poverty is a concern about inequality at the 
bottom, given that the poverty line is a fraction of median income. 
19 For past trends, see Goodman et al (1997). Note that other measures of inequality, such as 
the 90:10 ratio, have fallen since 1997/8: see Brewer et al (2007b). 
 184. A focus on some specific evaluations 
This section provides a closer look at some of the evaluations of the UK 
Government’s policies, describing econometric evaluations of WFTC, NDYP, 
and Pathways to Work. 
4.1 Working Families’ Tax Credit  
As one of the highest-profile changes to be made early on by the present UK 
Government, WFTC has been evaluated in a number of studies, and these are 
summarised in Brewer and Browne (2006). The review compared studies that 
had treated the introduction of WFTC as a natural experiment with one that 
used a structural model of labour supply to simulate ex post the impact of 
WFTC compared with its predecessor. In general, the results from both sets of 
studies are reassuringly similar (this can also be viewed as a validation of the 
structural model). 
Those studies that treated the introduction of WFTC as a natural experiment 
used difference-in-differences to estimate the impact of WFTC on the 
employment of families with children, making use of families without children 
as a control group. The raw data underlying this is shown in Figure 4.1: there is 
a clear convergence in the employment rate of lone parents with single adults 
without children which, prima facie, would suggest a positive employment 
effect of WFTC.
20
                                                      
20 In fact, the convergence starts some time before October 1999, and the various studies 
reviewed by Brewer and Browne (2006) have different ways of accounting for this. 



















































































Single adults without children
 
Notes: Not seasonally adjusted. The employment rate is calculated as the percentage of the 
population of working age (16–59 for women and 16–64 for men) who are in employment 
(working at least one hour in the reference week or temporarily away from a job). 
Source: Brewer and Shephard (2005), based on Labour Force Survey data, various years. 
 
One limitation of the difference-in-differences approach is that it cannot 
evaluate the impact of WFTC alone on labour market behaviour of families 
with children, because WFTC was introduced around the same time as other 
tax and benefit reforms that affected families with children (most of which 
were referred to in section 3). Technically, those studies using difference-in-
differences are evaluating the impact of all changes to the economic and policy 
environment that affected families with children differently from families 
without children: the most important of these other than WFTC was an increase 
in welfare benefits for families with children.  
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate this by showing the impact of tax and benefit 
changes between April 1999 and April 2002 (ie just before WFTC was 
introduced to just before CTC and WTC replaced it) on the budget constraints 
faced by a lone parent and by a mother in a couple respectively, both with two 
children aged under 5 and earning the 2002 minimum wage. Figure 4.2 makes 
clear that the income available to a lone parent who was not working increased 
substantially over this period, although by slightly less than the income 
available to a low-earning working lone parent. Figure 4.3 shows that the 
income available to the family when the second earner does not work increased 
substantially, but the income available to the family when both adults worked 
increased by much less, consistent with a higher PTR (see section 4.1).  
Figure 4.2. Change in the budget constraint for a lone parent with two children under 5, 

















































Note: Assumes hourly wage of £4.10, no housing costs or council tax liability, no entitlement 
Figure 4.3. Change in the budget constraint for mother in couple with two children 
to child support and no childcare costs.  
 

















































Notes: Assumes hourly wage of £4.10, no housing costs or council tax liability and no 
A structural model of labour supply tries to relate directly choices of whether 
•  for adults in workless families, lead to a stronger incentive to work 16 or 
more hours per week. We would therefore expect some currently workless 
childcare costs. The first earner in the couple is assumed to earn £300 per week in 2002 
prices. 
 
and how much to work to the inherent financial incentives. If we remember that 
WFTC was both more generous and more slowly withdrawn than its 
predecessor (Section 3.2), then economic theory would predict different effects 
on different groups of parents. In particular, the increase in generosity would: 
 21families to participate as a result of this reform, and also some parents 
currently working less than 16 hours per week to move over the threshold.  
lead to a reduction in the number of two-worker families, when two-worker •   
families found they needed to work a little less hard in order to achieve their 
Th dults in 
different families depending on their income: 
ould be an increase in the 
returns to an extra hour’s work as a result of the lower withdrawal rate, 
•  se who previously earned too much to claim FC 
but who were now eligible for WFTC would experience both an income 
The Ta
simulations of WFTC alone on lone parents: employment is predicted to rise by 
upply 
pre-reform standard of living (an income effect away from work).  
e lower withdrawal rate would also have different effects on a
•  For those previously claiming FC, there w
leading to an increase in the number of hours worked (a substitution 
effect towards work).  
On the other hand, tho
and a substitution effect away from work. 
ble below [apologies: copied directly from PDF] shows the results of the 
5.1 ppts (from 45.3%), and mean hours worked increases amongst workers 
(because the lower withdrawal rate increased incomes the most where the taper 
previously ended, usually corresponding to full-time work). However, the 
reforms implemented at the same time as the WFTC acted to reduce 
employment amongst lone parents, and a simulation of the set of changes 
actually introduced between 1999 and 2002 (not shown here) suggests that tax 
and benefit changes increased lone parent employment by 3.7 ppts. 
Table 4.1. The estimated impact of WFTC on lone mothers’ labour s
   After  WFTC      
   Not  working Part- me  Full-time  Total  ti
Before WFTC  Not working  49.6 2.4  2.8 54.7 
  Part-time  0.0 22.4 1.1 23.5 
  Full-time  0.0 0.41  21.4  21.8 
  Total  49.6 25.2 25.2  100.0 
Change in employmen 5.1 (0.68)  t rate       
Average change in week s  1.78  )  ly hour
(all) 
   (0.21
Average change in weekly hours 
(workers) 
    0.75  (0.05) 
Average hours before WFTC (all)        12.42 (0.20) 
Average hours before WFTC      27.4  (0.16) 
(workers) 
Notes: based on Table 4 in Brewer et al (2006 . Estimated standard deviations iven in b b)  g rackets.  
 22Estimates of the overall impact on employment are given below: although the 
impact of WFTC on lone parents employment is relatively high, the impact on 
adults in couples with children is broadly neutral, and those reforms 
implemented at the same time as WFTC acted to reduce labour supply. The 
combined effect of 22,000 workers corresponds to less than 0.1 ppt of the total 
workforce. 
Table 4.2. The Estimated Impact of WFTC on total employment 







WFTC  75,000 -21,000 27,000 81,000 
WFTC and contemporaneous 
reforms 
55,000 -18,000 -15,000 22,000 
Notes: based on Table 4 in Brewer et al (2006b). Estimated standard deviations given in brackets.  
Overall then,  Brewer and Browne (2006) conclude that: 
“WFTC seems to have had the positive impacts on labour market 
participation from previously workless families that we would expect 
from economic theory. Furthermore, large negative effects on the labour 
market participation of second earners do not seem to have materialised.  
The increased generosity of the in-work credit system seems to have 
induced lone mothers to increase their participation in the labour market 
by around 5 ppts between 1999 and 2002, and by a little less than this 
between 1999 and 2000. Much of this shift seems to have been into full-
time work, and there also seems to have been a considerable shift among 
lone mothers from part-time to full-time work.  
Among adults in couples with dependent children, there is some 
evidence that WFTC reduced the proportions of two-earner households 
and of workless households, just as we would expect from economic 
theory, but with little overall effect on the proportion of adults in these 
households who work.” 
4.2  New Deal for Young People  
Two studies have looked in detail at the NDYP: Blundell et al (2004) looked at 
the programme in its early days, and de Giorgio (2005) examined whether the 
early impacts were stable over later cohorts.  
Blundell et al (2004) looked at the job assistance and wage subsidy element of 
the New Deal by examining flows off unemployed to jobs during the first four 
months of treatment (the “Gateway” period). They present a number of 
difference in difference estimators making use of two sources of differential 
eligibility. First, they look at the first areas to pilot the NDYP, where they are 
able to use young adults in similar areas not operating NDYP as a control 
 23group. Second, they look at a time when the programme ran nationally, and use 
slightly older (and therefore ineligible) adults as a control group.  
They conclude that the outflow rate to jobs has risen by about 20 per cent for 
young men as a result of the New Deal during its National Roll Out (i.e. five 
percentage points more men find jobs in the first four months of the New Deal 
above a pre-program level of twenty five percentage points).
21 The results are 
very similar when using regional comparison groups to when older, ineligible 
adults are used as the control group; this suggests that either equilibrium wage 
and substitution effects are not very strong or they broadly cancel each other 
out. 
The idea of using older, ineligible, adults as a control group was exploited 
further in De Giorgi (2005), who estimate a local average treatment effect 
(LATE) using a non-parametric regression discontinuity. De Giorgi is also able 
to look at outcomes after a longer period of time (ie up to 12 months after 
starting the gateway, rather than 4 months) and for a series of different cohorts. 
Reassuringly, the study also finds that the NDYP increases the proportion of 
unemployed men who move into work by about 6-7%, and that this impact is  
relatively stable over time.  
4.3  Pathways to work 
As is common with reforms piloted by the UK Department for Work and 
Pensions, the Pathways to Work policies were first introduced in a number of 
areas. As with the pilots of the NDYP, this naturally suggests a difference in 
difference evaluation, using claimants of incapacity benefits in non-pilot areas 
as a control group. 
Figure 4.4 applies this concept to administrative data, and shows that flows off 
incapacity benefits in the pilot areas were around 8 percentage points higher in 
the six months after starting a claim than in other areas, and that this effect 
occurred for both phases of pilots.  
Figure 4.4 Six-month off-flow rate from incapacity benefits, by whether or not 
subject to the Pathways to Work pilots in October 2003 (Phase 1) or April 2004 
(Phase 2). 
                                                      
21 Women make up around 1 in 4 participants on NDYP; Blundell et al (2004) reports that the 
estimated impacts on women were smaller, less precisely estimated, and not robust to the 

















































































































































































































Source: Chart 2, Page 54 of House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee (2006). See also Blyth 
(2006). 
In a more formal evaluation, Table 4.3 shows difference-in-differences 
estimates of the outcomes of interest for those who made an enquiry about 
claiming incapacity benefits (having taking into account background 
characteristics, time since the enquiry and broad area of residence). 
The first column shows the early impact of the Pathways to Work pilots on the 
likelihood of being in paid work in the week before to the second wave 
interview (which is on average around 10½ months after the individual made 
the initial enquiry about claiming incapacity benefits
 22). It shows that the early 
impact of the Pathways to Work policy was to increase the percentage of 
individuals doing paid work at that time by +9.4 percentage points. To place 
this in context, just under one-third (31.9%) of those in the pilot areas in the 
period after the pilots had been implemented reported that they had been in 
paid work in the previous week, so the estimated impact suggests that in the 
absence of these pilots the employment rate in the last week would have been 
just 22.5% (i.e. 31.9–9.4).
 
Table 4.3 Difference-in-differences estimates of the early impact, all who made 
enquiry about claiming incapacity benefits 










  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Sample  size 7,861 7,861 7,861 7,861 
Adjusted  R^2  14.9% 13.8% 11.0% 34.2% 
      
Note: Unweighted. Standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes that the coefficient is statistically different 
from zero at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Other variables controlled for include 
days since initial enquiry into claiming IB, broad area of residence, and a set of demographic variables, 
education level and initial health condition. 
Source: Derived from tables in chapter 4 of Adam et al (2006) 
 
The estimates also suggest that the early effects of the pilots were to increase 
monthly earnings (by £71.73, or over a quarter of total earnings in the pilot 
areas), reduce the likelihood an individual was claiming incapacity benefits by 
8 percentage points, and reduce the percentage of respondents reporting that 
their health limited their daily activities. The pilots seem to have been more 
successful at helping older workers, and those who did not claim to have 
mental health problems. However, the authors stress that these are preliminary 
results covering a very short period of time, and more evidence on medium-run 
impacts are needed. 
5. Conclusions  
This paper has presented a tour of welfare reform in the UK over the past 
decade since the last change of government. It has presented the most 
important changes in active labour market policies, and to measures intended to 
strengthen financial incentives to work, including a minimum wage and 
parental subsidies for spending on work-related childcare.  
We have argued that the developments in the UK’s active labour market 
policies went in two broad phases: first, the Government sought to strengthen 
ALMPs for those individuals claiming Jobseeker’s Allowance, the benefit for 
those deemed to be unemployed, chiefly through various New Deal 
programmes. Second, the Government has turned to those individuals claiming 
benefits because they are not in work, but who traditionally have been viewed 
as inactive and therefore excused from job search activity: lone parents, and the 
sick and disabled (those claiming incapacity benefits). For both those groups, 
we have seen a gradual escalation in the requirements asked of benefit 
recipients, and in the focus on work, but this has stopped short of requiring job-
search (or similar activities) as a condition of receiving benefit. 
There have also been two phases of changes to taxes, benefits and  financial 
work incentives. A set of changes in the late 1990s (including the WFTC) 
 26aimed to strengthen financial work incentives. But tax credits for families with 
children and in-work support for those without children were comprehensively 
altered in 2003 in a reform whose economic rationale is less clear. UK 
assessments of the merits of the 2003 reform have ever since been (rightly) 
dominated by operational concerns, and recent government policy on tax 
credits and financial work incentives is harder to infer than it was nearly a 
decade ago, except perhaps for an increased use of targeted and time-limited 
in-work payments. 
Blundell (2002) describes the goals of welfare reform as being to reduce 
government expenditure, increase the income of the poor (or low skilled) and 
increase labour supply; what varies across countries and over time is the 
relative weight given to these often contradictory goals. Where within this 
triangle can we place the current UK government? We would argue that the 
reforms to ALMPs are primarily motivated by the desire to reduce spending on 
welfare benefits, and to increase labour supply and thereby GDP.  
However, the aims of the Government’s changes to taxes and benefits are less 
clear cut. Although we have argued that there have been a set of changes to 
taxes and benefits designed deliberately to strengthen financial work 
incentives, the story is more complicated than this, for at least two reasons. 
First, the expansion of the WFTC and the expansion in the generosity of tax 
credits that followed have generally been weakening the financial work 
incentives of (potential) second earners in families with children. Second, as 
well as increasing the generosity of tax credits that are conditional on work, 
welfare benefits for families with children and (after 2003), the child tax credit 
(which is not work-contingent, and is means-tested with an extremely generous 
earnings disregard) have been increased too. In other words, the extent to 
which financial work incentives have been strengthened has been compromised 
by the Government’s desire to achieve broad reductions in relative child 
poverty. And it has learnt that, although welfare to work measures can help 
reduce child poverty, achieving short-run reductions in child poverty is only 
possible with increases to the generosity of benefits and tax credits available to 
low-income families with children, and in recent years, this has increasingly 
meant increases in income-related payments to families with children, with 
obvious implications for financial work incentives. 
We have also summarised independent evaluations of three important UK 
policies: WFTC, NDYP and the newer Pathways to Work pilots. All have been 
deemed by the Government to have been “successful”. However, for WFTC 
and Pathways to Work, this is true only if “success” is defined as “has had a 
desirable impact on outcomes of interest”; to date only NDYP has been subject 
to a full cost and benefit analysis.  
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